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Discussion Piece 
Truth and Reconciliation in Psychiatry: A response to Spandler and McKeown 
Abstract 
Purpose: To critique Spandler and McKeown's recent advocacy of a Truth and 
Reconciliation process in psychiatry. 
Approach: A critique of a recent article in Mental Health Review Journal. 
Findings: That Spandler and McKeown's advocacy of a Truth and Reconciliation process in 
psychiatry can be criticised from a number of inter-related practical, political and ethical 
perspectives. 
Value: The present critique contributes to the ongoing debate about the desirability of a Truth 
and Reconciliation process in psychiatry. 
Keywords: Forced psychiatry, Truth and reconciliation, Testimony, Democracy 
Introduction 
Helen Spandler and Mick McKeown’s (2017) recent article in this journal on the prospects of 
a Truth and Reconciliation (T&R) process in psychiatry was strong and thought-provoking. 
Although this response offers seven criticisms against their arguments in favour of T&R, it 
accepts that the article establishes the terms of the current debate around T&R and, as such, is 
a significant text for activists, academics and professionals. It demands close attention. In 
response, I write as a sociologist of psychiatry in the UK in the post-WWII period and, in 
particular, as a historian of the user/survivor social movement from the 1970s onwards.1 The 
goal of the response is to contribute to the debate around T&R. 
                                                          
1 For consistency of exposition, I use the ‘term’ survivor’ throughout this article. 
Spandler and McKeown’s argument 
Spandler and McKeown’s argument can be summed up briefly. T&R, canonically represented 
by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, was a collective form of public 
apology and truth-telling about social injustice specifically motivated by a desire for peace and 
nation-building in one post-apartheid society. As Spandler and McKeown (2017, p. 84) 
observe, its aim was “restorative rather than retributive justice, providing amnesty for 
perpetrators and reparation for victims”. They acknowledge a difference in the application of 
T&R to psychiatry in that there has never been a public apology for or collective recognition 
of psychiatric injustice either by a nation-state, supra-national organisation (for example the 
United Nations [UN]) or the institution of psychiatry itself. Nevertheless, they argue for a 
“grassroots” version of T&R in the absence of such recognition and they provide some recent 
examples in which “new spaces for…dialogue” (ibid, p. 87) have been opened up between 
survivors and mental health workers, leading to new and mutually beneficial “understandings”. 
A strong aspect of Spandler and McKeown’s argument is that they anticipate most possible 
objections to T&R: that there has been no public apology for social injustice therefore T&R 
cannot really “get off the ground”; that workers might feel alienated by the T&R process and 
not engage with it; that the analogy with other human rights abuses (such as apartheid) is 
inappropriate; and that T&R is just a manifestation of “therapy culture” (Furedi, 2003) that 
would be better replaced by the “real” business of political activism. They effectively deal with 
these objections but I want to pick up on some of the loose ends they leave hanging in the rest 
of this response. First, however, I want to contextualise the debate in terms of contemporary 
UK psychiatry. 
Psychiatry as a social institution 
How do Spandler and McKeown characterise psychiatry as a social institution? They describe 
it as a “set of related practices in which mental health professionals are involved” (p. 83). When 
it comes to specifying these practices they include amongst a “litany of harms…lobotomies, 
incarceration, seclusion and restraint, harmful drugging, electroshock and stigmatising 
diagnoses” (p. 85). They note that these practices are historical but also contemporary. More 
widely, they point to psychiatry’s tendency to “colonising expansion” and to the “epistemic 
injustice” (ibid.) caused by the diminution of survivors’ experiential knowledge by the 
dominance of the bio-medical paradigm.  
However, there is more to be said about the historical/contemporary distinction because 
Spandler and McKeown tend to blur the boundary. This is my first criticism of their article. 
Historically, there can be no doubt about the use of psychosurgery, electroshock [ECT] and 
forced treatment generally associated with the asylum system of care (Mental Health Media, 
2000). But how widespread are these practices in the UK today? Neurosurgery for mental 
disorder (Royal College of Psychiatrists [RCP], 2017a), the contemporary medical name for 
lobotomy, is very rare and cannot be performed without an individual’s consent. In 2012/13 
the mental health charity MIND noted that only 4 people had received the treatment (MIND, 
2015). ECT is more common but still statistically rare: in 2016/17 1682 people were treated in 
England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Ireland mostly for severe depression of which 51% were 
informal patients who consented to the treatment (RCP, 2017b). As amended by the 2007 
Mental Health Act, ECT can only be given with an individual’s consent or, where formally 
detained and in the absence of mental capacity, second opinions have been sought (Department 
of Health, 2007). The practice of “forced psychiatry”, a term employed by Tina Minkowitz to 
include all of the above plus the administering of medication without consent as well as 
“degrading practices” such as ‘forced nakedness or wearing institutional clothing” (2015, p. 
176), is more widespread. The Care Quality Commission’s (CQC) recent report into “The state 
of care in mental health services, 2014-2017” (2017) still found over 30% of institutional care 
“unsafe” and the “use of restrictive practices and physical restraint” still common.  
These facts should be seen in terms of the wider context of increasing psychiatric coercion in 
the UK. In 2005/06 there were 43 361 detentions under the Mental Health Act (MHA) in 
England; by 2015/16 this had risen to 63 622 (NHS Digital, 2016). The main legislative reform 
of the period, the 2007 Mental Health Act which introduced Community Treatment Orders 
(CTOs) for the first time in the UK was expected to be rarely used; but it has been deployed 
for over 4000 people a year since 2011/12 (ibid.). Section 136 of the 1983 MHA – the police 
power to remove someone thought to be suffering from a mental disorder from a public place 
and taken to a “place of safety” – has increased four-fold in the last decade and stood at 22 965 
detentions in England for 2015/16 (ibid.). 
I state these facts because Spandler and McKeown’s advocacy of T&R occurs, it seems to me, 
against the assumed backdrop of forced psychiatry within an asylum system of care. There is 
little doubt that there should be widespread public recognition of the human rights abuses of 
that historical system.  But the system within which contemporary T&R might take place is 
different. It is not necessarily less coercive, as the above statistics confirm, but such coercion 
take place in a wider variety of institutional sites ranging from asylum-like “total institutions” 
(Goffman, 1961) (prisons and the “Special” hospitals), to psychiatric in-patient wards in 
general hospitals, accident and emergency departments (where section 136 patients are often 
deposited) to people’s own homes (for CTOs). It may be that grassroots T&R may be 
applicable to these areas but the model of “speaking truth” to the power of mostly hospital 
psychiatrists and hospital nurses modelled on the “total institution” would surely have to be 
adapted to include, amongst others, community nurses, social workers, psychiatric liaison 
nurses, the police, and prison officers. Contemporary mental health care is complex but this 
complexity is not recognised in Spandler and McKeown’s advocacy of TR. 
Moreover, forced psychiatry is only part of this system. The rest of the “litany” of 
contemporary “hurts” comes under the heading of psychiatry’s “colonising expansion” and 
“epistemic injustices”. Again, contemporary psychiatry as a social institution needs to be 
adequately described if we are to situate the prospects for T&R within it. Just like forced 
psychiatry, “voluntary” psychiatry is complex. Here are some relevant facts: the UK 
government spends about £11 billion per year on mental health care split between 54 mental 
health trusts (in England) (Crisp et al, 2016); the psychiatric workforce (in the NHS in England) 
is comprised of approximately 40 000 qualified nurses, 21 000 unqualified nurses, and 4 500 
consultant psychiatrists (NHS Digital, 2017). Social workers and voluntary sector staff would 
need to be added to this number to complete the staffing picture as would mental health workers 
in the devolved administrations of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. These staff work 
across a range of secondary mental health services including hospital wards, community mental 
health teams, home treatment crisis resolution teams, assertive outreach and early intervention 
in psychosis teams. Secondary mental health services in England provided care to 1.8 million 
services users in 2015 and this resulted in a total of over 20 million face-to-face annual contacts 
(NHS Digital, 2015).  
Again, I state these facts to emphasise the complexity of contemporary psychiatry. Spandler 
and McKeown do not recognise this complexity and their occasional comments on the 
contemporary situation seem to assume a scenario of forced psychiatry only according to an 
out-dated asylum model. Neither of the concrete examples they give from the UK where they 
claim “TR processes might help” (p. 85) (the Mid-Staffordshire Foundation Trust and the 
Winterbourne View abuse scandal) actually involved psychiatric care at all; whilst the USA 
example they cite of grassroots TR in practice fails to specify just what sorts of psychiatric 
services survivors had experienced or the jobs and statuses of the mental health workers present 
during the T&R process (pp. 87-88). The impression given is these were survivors of forced 
psychiatry – but the details are never made clear. This, then, is my second criticism of Spandler 
and McKeown: they work with an abstract model of (out-dated) psychiatry and then graft onto 
that their advocacy of T&R which they then claim applies to the contemporary situation. The 
complexity of contemporary psychiatry goes unrecognised. 
In the next section, I deal with some loose ends which Spandler and McKeown leave hanging 
in their attempt to forestall some predictable objections to T&R. 
Loose Ends 
 Psychiatric T&R is not state-sponsored and state-backed – so it has to come from the 
“grassroots” social movement.  
This position is correct. There has never been any state-recognition of the harms caused by 
psychiatry by the UK government – nor is there ever likely to be outside of specific inquiries 
into scandals and abuses. Spandler and McKeown make the best of this scenario by building 
the contribution of social movement-initiated (“grassroots”) T&R. But surely this distinction 
between post-apartheid T&R and psychiatric T&R is a difference that makes a big difference. 
It is a question of legitimacy and power. South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
was established by act of parliament and possessed wide-ranging legal powers to subpoena 
witnesses, grant amnesties to perpetrators of abuses and award reparations to victims. 
Psychiatric grassroots T&R, by contrast, would have no such legitimacy and possess no such 
powers. To run with the analogy would be to imagine the African National Congress (ANC) 
deciding to set up the T&R commission before they won elected power in South Africa. It is 
true, as Spandler and McKeown argue for psychiatric T&R, that they could still have gathered 
“multiple testimonies” (p. 88) – but without the judicial status of the commission the truth of 
these testimonies could have been questioned and the process accused of bias. The same 
criticisms would surely be levelled at grassroots T&R and this would affect the willingness of 
mental health workers to engage in it. This is my third criticism of their article. It brings me on 
to my next point. 
 Workers might feel alienated by the T&R process and not engage with it. 
Spandler and McKeown tend to minimise this point and argue instead that workers might 
benefit from T&R through its capacity to raise awareness that they are also “damaged by the 
system that they work in” (p. 90) and are victims of violence too. Unfortunately, violence 
against mental health workers has increased (Trades Union Congress, 2016). But it is 
implausible to argue that T&R could be a vehicle for addressing the issue. T&R’s raison d’etre 
is survivor, not worker, experience – and that is appropriate. The violence experienced by 
mental health workers forms a part of the overall context of “crisis” within which psychiatry 
currently functions. Services were axed by £600 million during the Coalition government and 
this included nursing cuts at the same time as workloads were surging upwards (McNicoll, 
2015). In this context, it is hard to see nurses willingly embracing a T&R process that is by its 
nature challenging. Precisely the same observation could be made for social workers. It is not 
so much that they might feel alienated when confronted by T&R; it is more that they may just 
feel burnt out by excessive workloads and management bullying. The workers who would be 
most likely to engage with T&R would be those already recruited to the survivor movement’s 
cause. An example would be the testimony of Chris Chapman (2014) in the book Psychiatry 
Disrupted, confessing to his own use of physical violence in an institutional setting. Ironically, 
though, the participation of such self-reflective workers in the T&R process would really be 
surplus to requirements as these would be precisely the workers who would benefit from the 
experience least. T&R would be preaching to the converted. So, I think grassroots T&R would 
in practice struggle to recruit the mental health workers it needs for the process to work outside 
of those already committed to the movement’s cause. This is my fourth criticism of Spandler 
and McKeown. 
 The analogy with other human rights abuses (such as apartheid) is inappropriate 
It is absolutely appropriate that psychiatry should be understood according to a human rights 
framework. Indeed, the most important global development in the field of mental health in the 
last decade has been the incorporation of “psycho-social disability” into the UN’s Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). It follows from this that any analogy with 
other human rights abuses is not only appropriate but could be illuminating. On the other hand, 
an analogy is really just a comparison, one which emphasises relevant similarities and 
differences between two contrasted phenomena. The comparison with apartheid, or with 
genocide, is similar only to the extent that it emphasises the oppression of collectives; the 
difference is that apartheid or genocide “pick out” collectives for oppression based upon clearly 
defined constructions of ethnic identity – they are basically forms of racism. The oppression 
associated with psychiatry is not a form of racism – although psychiatry can be racist (see 
Fernando, 2014) – it is essentially a form of discrimination based upon what Minkowitz (2015) 
called “perceived disability”. Distressed or euphoric people come into contact with psychiatry 
where they may be perceived as “mad” and a range of oppressive practices may then flow from 
that perception, including forced psychiatry. This specific form of discrimination is what the 
activists within Mad Studies have called “sanism” (Menzies et al, 2013). This invites a number 
of analogies and comparisons. The most obvious one is with the disability rights movement 
and the social model of disability. But Spandler and McKeown hint at another analogy when 
they point out the “increasing evidence of links between childhood abuse and mental health 
problems” (p. 85). This emphasises a similarity between survivor-experience and feminism in 
terms of a range of traumas of the life-course (childhood abuse and sexual violence primarily). 
What is significant about this analogy is the way in which it tends to minimise the prospects of 
T&R. Generally, feminist activism has made much use of the practice of survivor testimony, 
in the form of, for instance, rape crisis “speak outs”, but this has not been for the purpose of 
“reconciliation”. On the contrary, feminist testimony has functioned primarily to build the 
movement and to identify perpetrators; whilst feminist legal activism has rarely concerned 
itself with restorative justice but, rather, with retributive justice and legal reform in pursuit of 
that end (see McGlynn, 2011). It would not seem conceivable, for example, for sexual abuse 
survivors to engage in a T&R process with those who had abused them. This analogy rather 
seems to suggest that psychiatric survivors should not give up too quickly on retributive justice 
or legal reform (for example, the repeal of existing mental health law and its replacement with 
legislation that is CRPD-compliant). One example of contemporary sexual abuse survivor 
activism has been their involvement in the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse 
(IICSA), which is state-sponsored and state-backed - but not a T&R process. So, my fifth 
criticism of Spandler and McKeown is that, in advocating for T&R as a form of social justice 
which is specifically restorative, they may be giving up too quickly on more substantive forms 
of retributive justice and legal reform. 
 T&R is just a manifestation of “therapy culture” (Furedi, 2003) that would be better 
replaced by the “real” business of political activism. 
Spandler and McKeown correctly oppose this perspective arguing that it creates a “false 
dichotomy” between personal transformation and “structural critique” (p. 90). As they rightly 
observe, the personal is political and vice versa: the individual testimonies that might be 
witnessed in a T&R process are neither forms of therapy nor just autobiographical statements. 
They form part of a political  project in which the “dialogical potential of grassroots T&R 
provides opportunities for bottom-up transformation grounded in the practical, concrete and 
hard-fought realities of struggle” (ibid.). However, in the next section I criticise Spandler and 
McKeown for the use of two notions which are central to their advocacy of T&R but remain 
undeveloped in their article: testimony and democracy. 
Testimony & Democracy 
Spandler and McKeown do see survivor-testimony as central to the truth-telling aspect of T&R. 
The “public expression of private pain” can “promote greater compassion and community, raise 
collective consciousness, provide accountability and promote healing” (p.84). Nevertheless, 
they note limits to testimony within T&R due to its potential to re-traumatise the survivor; but 
more significantly, because T&R involves a “reciprocal commitment to critical self-reflection, 
cognisant of the complexities of the distribution of harms both between and within groups” 
they argue for a need for it to go “beyond testimony…in emphasising a common humanity” (p. 
85). The problem here is the over-simplification of testimony understood as a form of political 
activism. 
There is now a significant literature on testimony within the survivor movement (Costa et al, 
2012; Cresswell, 2005; Morrigan, 2017; Woods, 2012). This tends to distance itself from 
academic research on illness-narratives (for example, Frank, 2013) by emphasising the political 
functions of testimony. There are three of these: 1) testimony builds the movement by 
recruiting new members who are inspired by its emotional impact; 2) testimony contests power 
by indicting the abuses of psychiatry and by substituting survivors’ experiential knowledge for 
psychiatry’s “objective” knowledge; 3) testimony resists its own co-optation by psychiatry for 
the purposes of shoring up its (psychiatry’s) power through the dissemination of diluted 
testimonies of “mental illness” and “recovery”. These functions are essentially double-edged: 
they may fail or even provoke a backlash either because the witness to a testimony – in the case 
considered here, the mental health worker during a T&R process – disbelieves it, re-interprets 
it as a “symptom” of clinical pathology, or else is moved by its impact but only as a “voyeur”. 
The latter phenomenon has been castigated as little more than “patient porn” (Pembroke, 2004; 
Costa et al, 2012). 
At first sight, it may seem that these functions of testimony are conducive to Spandler and 
McKeown’s advocacy of T&R. Indeed, I can imagine a scenario in which a survivor of, say, 
restraint and seclusion in an in-patient setting, gives testimony to that effect during a T&R 
process, the testimony is witnessed and accepted by mental health workers resulting in sincere 
apologies and a “reconciliation” based upon a shared understanding of the “complexities of the 
distribution of harms” in that particular clinical setting. Perhaps the survivor will also listen to 
workers recount incidents of “patient” violence so that she can then acknowledge those 
“complexities” too. The problem, though, is that a simplification has occurred in this scenario 
based upon a misunderstanding of the functions of testimony. Because Spandler and 
McKeown’s primary purpose is to build alliances between survivors and workers, they relegate 
the status of testimony to that of a precursor to the development of “more peaceful 
relationships” (p. 85). But testimony is not necessarily a precursor to that; essentially, it is a 
truth-claim in which a witness (a mental health worker) is called upon to validate survivor-
experience and to accept responsibility for the political consequences of that validation. 
However, as noted above, such validation is only one possible consequence of bearing witness 
to testimony: denial, pathologisation and voyeurism are others. Considering such possibilities, 
it is hard to see why survivors should commit to a T&R process. They may bring the “truth” 
with them into the process. But why should they wish for the “reconciliation”? This 
simplification of testimony is my sixth criticism of Spandler and Mckeown. 
It could be objected at this point that I am being too pessimistic about T&R. After all, Spandler 
and McKeown make their own optimism clear: “T&R processes…are based on an optimistic 
view of human relationships and a belief that social change is possible” (p. 84). But, here, I 
think we should be careful about words. “Opimistic” and “pessimistic” are everyday adjectives 
that carry a lot of pejorative meaning. And when you apply them to democratic processes, they 
also carry a lot of theoretical meaning. Spandler and McKeown do not say much about 
democracy in their article although Spandler has for years been associated with Asylum 
magazine, subtitled “the magazine for democratic psychiatry”. In the section of their article 
with the subtitle “Communicative processes in reconciliation” (pp. 87-88), they highlight some 
of the key democratic features of the T&R process: it “creates new spaces for conversations, 
listening and dialogue…The ‘understandings’ reached may not belong to any individuals, 
rather being collectively constructed through concerted attention over the course of the 
proceedings” (ibid.). 
Elsewhere, Spandler and McKeown have written explicitly about the sort of democratic 
processes they advocate in building alliances between survivors and mental health workers. 
For instance, in their chapter in Madness, distress and the politics of disablement (2015), they 
endorse a modified form of Jurgen Habermas’s (1986) deliberative democracy: 
“Democratic forums must insist on equalised power relations…and respect for difference. 
Reason and persuasion are privileged and participants must be prepared to enter any debate 
ready to change their mind…Lengthy, considered discussions are often required, to explore 
more fully issues and different points of view, rather than a rush to achieve dominance or a 
too easy consensus” (McKeown and Spandler, 2015, p. 274) 
Basically, they transfer this model of deliberative democracy onto the T&R process so that 
whether it “works” or not largely depends upon the validity of the Habermasian framework. 
This is not the place to enter into a critique of that but it is the place to say that it is not the only 
theoretical framework available.  
Historically, there have been two sorts of theory that have opposed Habermas: first, the theory 
of power associated with Michel Foucault (1990); second, the theory of “radical democracy” 
associated with Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001). These oppose Habermas from two 
directions. First, Foucault’s notions that “power is everywhere” (1990, p.93) and “there is no 
exteriority in relation to power” (ibid, p. 95) challenge the idea, fundamental to T&R, that there 
can be “equalised power relations” within the T&R process. On the contrary, whatever unequal 
power relations existed exterior to the process, Foucault’s theory implies, will also be 
reproduced inside it. The double-edged responses to testimony noted above (acceptance, 
denial, pathologisation and voyeurism) basically follow this Foucauldian line – discriminatory 
practices directed against survivors may simply be reproduced inside the T&R process. Second, 
contra Habermas, Laclau and Mouffe maintain that it is social antagonism and not consensus 
that defines democracy. In other words, although the purpose of T&R, as Spandler and 
McKeown advocate, is “more peaceful relationships” and “reconciliation”, if it actually 
resulted in more anger and hostility between survivors and workers that would not necessarily 
make it any less democratic. The reason is that, for Laclau and Mouffe, radical democracy 
depends upon the construction of “friends” and “enemies” and upon political alliances forged 
through those oppositions. In a democracy, we cannot all just become “friends” – even after a 
T&R process. This leads to my seventh and final criticism of Spandler and McKeown: their 
“optimistic” account of the democratic processes manifest in T&R may in fact turn out to 
undermine democracy. They demonstrate a bias towards consensual and reconciled outcomes; 
whereas a more “pessimistic” outcome based upon the maintenance of social antagonisms may 
be more democratic. Given that Spandler and McKeown envisage a wide-ranging constituency 
for T&R – “bringing together service users, survivors and refusers of services with the staff 
who work/ed in them” (p. 83) – the “pessimistic” outcome might emerge as an admittedly 
antagonistic yet entirely realistic and democratic one.  
Conclusion 
There is no doubt that Spandler and McKeown have produced a piece of strong advocacy in 
favour of T&R in psychiatry.  It should structure the debate about T&R for some time to come. 
In response and to contribute to that debate, I have offered seven criticisms: 
1. That Spandler and McKeown blur the boundary between what is historical and what is 
contemporary psychiatry such that their advocacy of T&R assumes a model of asylums 
and “total institutions”. 
2. That they do not recognise the complexity of contemporary psychiatry. 
3. That grassroots T&R without state-backing would lack power and legitimacy. 
4. That mental health workers would not engage with the T&R process. 
5. That they give up too quickly on retributive justice and legal reform. 
6. That they over-simplify the political functions of testimony. 
7. That the consensual-bias of the T&R process could undermine democracy. 
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